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ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF BENCH PROBATION 
DOES NOT REQUIRE ABROGATION OF 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The issue before the Court is whether the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Griffin v. 
Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 868, 97 L.Ed. 709, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987) supports the claim by the 
State of Utah that police can conduct warrantless probation searches by claiming to be 
probation officers. (See State's brief at page 17 wherein the State claims that the search was 
valid because it was undertaken to protect the public and to prevent Defendant from violating 
his probation). 
A number of facts bear repetition in light of this claim by the State of Utah. 
1. Deputy Perkins admitted that he was "strictly a peace officer" and that he had 
no probation officer status. (Tr. Preliminary Hearing 6-26-98 at 38:12-15). 
2. Deputy Perkins admitted that he went to contact Defendant for the purpose of 
investigating whether or not a crime had occurred. (Id. At 39:1-5). This admission stands 
in stark contrast to any claim by the State that the purpose of the visit was to protect the 
public or to prevent Defendant from violating his probation. 
3. When pressed, Deputy Perkins further admitted that he was investigating to see 
"if there had been a crime committed," Id. 39:22, and that the probation order ". . . . gave me 
the authority to request a test." Id. 39:25. 
4. Deputy Perkins5 understanding was that Defendant"... had to submit a urine 
sample on demand to any police officer." Id. 40:13-16. 
5. On October 15th the deputy suspected Defendant of committing a crime, i.e. 
use of illegal drugs. Id. 42:18 
6. The October 15th activities of Deputy Perkins were strictly in Ms capacity as 
a law enforcement officer. Id. 48:17-25. 
7. No one from the Court or the Probation Department asked or directed Deputy 
Perkins to go out and conduct a drug test. Id. Tr. 50:15-19. 
In Griffin the Court ruled that it was reasonable to dispense with the warrant 
requirement when a probation officer conducted a search, at least in part because, [although 
a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he a police officer who normally 
conducts searches against the ordinary citizen." Griffin 483 U.S. 876. 
This instant prosecution presents a far different scenario, i.e. it is not reasonable to 
dispense with the warrant requirement because this case involves a police officer who 
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normally conducts a search against the ordinary citizen. 
The Griffin court went on to state that it would impair the probationer/probation 
officer relationship if the probation officer was requested to obtain a court approved search 
warrant. Griffin at 483 U.S. 879. 
Again, there was no probationer/probation officer relationship involved in this instant 
prosecution because the Defendant did not have a probation officer. 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly held in State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069 (Ut. 1987) 
that while a parole search is not in violation of the Fourth Amendment just because the police 
are involved or because evidence helpful to the police is obtained, such a search is invalid 
when the probation officer merely acts as a tool of the police. See Johnson, footnote 1 and 
2 at page 1072. 
The police officer was the person conducting the alleged probation search, there was 
no probation officer involved, the purpose was to conduct a police investigation and the 
officer used the illegal probation condition to further his work as a police officer, without 
any involvement by the Court or probation department. This was not a probation search and 
not ordered or requested by the probation department or the Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should rule that the conduct of Deputy Perkins violated ihe provisions of 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
DATED this V\ day of March 2000. 
i - ^ ^ - ^ -
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1), U.R.Ap.P. 
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